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The origins of industrialization in Central and East Central Europe reach back into the eighteenth 
century (Good, 1984; Komlos 1983, 1989). Much of this part of Europe was under Habsburg rule 
until the demise of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the end of World War I.1 The Habsburg realm’s 
geographical location at the cross-roads of Europe’s west and east meant that the timing and spatial 
diffusion of industrialization mirrored the broader European experience. It was in the regions adjacent 
to western Europe, Alpine Austria and the Czech lands, where ‘the growth impulses from England 
and of the continental northwest found fertile ground first’ (Good, 1984, p.15) and where the shift 
from proto-industrial to modern forms of manufacturing began in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century.  
 By the early 1870s, Austrian industrialization was well beyond the transitional phase that 
Komlos (1983) dated to have lasted to the mid-1820s and thus well into the ‘machine-industrial phase’ 
proper. However, as elsewhere in Europe, industrialization in the Habsburg lands, its timing and pace, 
was a process characterized by pronounced regional differences (Pollard, 1986). These gaps initially 
widened over the course of the nineteenth century, as industrial activity in Alpine Austria and the 
Czech lands gathered momentum. The western parts of Hungary followed significantly later with a 
first wave of industrial expansion in the late 1860s and early 1870s. Industrialization, though by 1913 
well advanced in the western and north-western regions of the empire, diffused only slowly to its 
most eastern and south-eastern regions. This had profound implications for the structure and growth 
of the East Central European economies throughout the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It is 
the stark unevenness in the extent of industrial activity across the regions of East Central Europe that 
prompts the question of how peripheral this periphery was. We suggest that, at least in a European 
context, the imaginary line between the ‘core’ and ‘the periphery’ ran through the Habsburg economy 
                                                             
1 We use the labels Imperial Austria (or Cisleithania) and  Imperial Hungary (or Transleithania) to distinguish the two 
main constituent parts of the Habsburg state after the 1867 constitutional compromise from the far smaller, post-1918 
successor states of Austria and Hungary in their new borders. Following Good (1984, pp.15-17), the labels Alpine Austria 
(including the regions of Lower Austria, Upper Austria, Styria, Salzburg, Carinthia, Tyrol and Vorarlberg) and Czech 
lands (Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia) are frequently used to identify the western and north-western parts of the Habsburg 
Empire that were the most industrialized. Despite post-1918 border changes, these latter groupings correspond broadly 




– from the west/north west to the east/south east, reflecting  the pattern of diffusion of modern 
economic growth emphasized in the historiography (Good, 1984; Pollard, 1986). The Empire’s 
unique position – being both close to and at the same time far away from the European industrial core 
- is, on the one hand, demonstrated by its prominent rank among the world’s leading machinery 
producers: by 1913, Austria-Hungary’s mechanical engineering industry, located mainly around 
Vienna and in the Czech lands, was in terms of output surpassed only by the United States, Britain 
and Germany (Schulze, 1996). Yet, on the other hand, the Habsburg economy included large, 
populous regions in the east where industrialization had made little, if any, headway by the time of 
the First World War. Galicia, for example, accounted for about 28 per cent of Imperial Austria’s 
population in 1910, but contributed less than six per cent of manufacturing output. 
In the early nineteenth century, the western half of the Habsburg Empire was economically in 
as promising a position as the territories of Germany proper (Freudenberger, 2003). At around 1820, 
per capita GDP was about 7 per cent higher than in Germany; the comparative income lead was even 
larger for the regions that form present-day Austria.2 That lead, though, was to disappear fast over 
the following decades. In this sense, then, the evidence lends some support to Alexander 
Gerschenkron’s pessimistic assessment of nineteenth century Austria as a case of ‘failure’ 
(Gerschenkron, 1977, p.54). Table 5.1 reports GDP per capita for Central Europe, expressed in 
percentages of the German level. Four initial, general observations stand out. First, in the late 
nineteenth century, the Habsburg Empire, especially its Austrian half, became considerably poorer in 
terms of per capita income than its newly unified German neighbour. To a large extent, this falling-
behind was an outcome of lower output and productivity growth in Cisleithanian industry which, in 
turn, was linked to significantly lower levels of human capital than in Germany (Schulze, 2007a). 
Second, for the late nineteenth century, there is a large development gap between Imperial Austria 
and Imperial Hungary (in pre-1918 borders) on the one hand and the empire’s economically most 
advanced regions located in what today constitute Austria and the Czech Republic, on the other. This 
is a reflection of the comparatively late onset of industrialization in Hungary and the eastern regions 
of the empire Third, there is some evidence of modest intra-empire catching up before 1914: the 
income gap between Cisleithania and Transleithania declined and so did the differentials between the 
territories of modern Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Fourth, over the long run there is a 
remarkable absence of significant changes in the relative levels of economic development within the 
broader region that we study, including Poland for comparison. Though her initial income lead turned 
                                                             
2 Building on the estimates in Schulze (2000), Imperial Austria’s GDP was extrapolated backward from its 1870 level 
drawing on rates of change in agriculture and services from Kausel (1979) and in industry from Komlos (1983). Likewise 
for modern Austria with the exception of industry which is projected backward using Kausel’s rates of change. 
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into a lag between 1870 and 1913, Austria was broadly on a par in level terms with the German 
economy (in its 1990 borders) throughout most of the modern era, with the notable exception of the 
disastrous episode of the 1930s. The East Central European economies, on the other hand, lagged 
behind both Germany and Austria and, although the size of this developmental gap did not remain 
constant over time, it is today astonishingly similar to what it was more than a hundred years ago.  
 
Table 5.1. GDP per capita in Central Europe (Germany = 100) 
  1870 1890 1913 1929 1937 1950 1973 1989 2008 
Imperial Austria 77 66 60 
      
Imperial Hungary 52 51 46 
      
Austria 111 95 86 91 67 95 94 99 108 
Czechoslovakia 81 73 67 75 62 90 59 53 64 
Hungary 59 58 54 61 54 64 47 42 52 
Poland 51 53 48 52 41 63 45 34 49 
Sources: a) Imperial Austria, Imperial Hungary: Schulze (2000), with some revisions; b) Austria, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary for 1870-1913: preliminary new estimates based on revisions of regional GDPs from Schulze (2007b) and border 
adjustments; c) all other: Maddison Project (http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm). The 
percentages are calculated from figures expressed in 1990 GK dollars and, except for Imperial Austria and Imperial 
Hungary, and refer to 1990 borders. 
 
If there is one message to take away from studying the economic history of East Central Europe 
in the era of modern economic growth, then it is this absence of cross-country convergence in levels 
of economic development over the long run. East Central Europe had begun to industrialise before 
the rest of the global periphery, and thus it is better described as ‘half-periphery’. However, it has 
remained a half-periphery and has failed to catch-up to, or even significantly narrow the gap vis-à-
vis the European core of advanced economies. East Central Europe thus failed to take advantage of 
its relative economic backwardness (Gerschenkron, 1962) and to exploit its catch-up potential 
(Abramovitz, 1986). After the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the following sharp depression that 
lasted into the mid-1990s, the income gap began to decline gradually, but so far this convergence 
only just sufficed to make up for the ground lost during the socialist era. 
 While some of the general patterns we describe prevailed in the wider region of East Central 
Europe, the geographical focus is limited to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and its three main 
successor states, whose post-1918 territory remained entirely within the borders of the Habsburg 
Empire. The aim here is to quantify the level, structure and trajectory of industrial development 
between 1870 and 2005 within, as much as possible, the borders of current day Austria, Hungary, and 
the Czech and Slovak Republics. The latter two will be referred to, for the most part, as 
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Czechoslovakia. Throughout the chapter, industry is defined as the sum of mining, manufacturing 
and public utilities, except when stated otherwise. For the inter-war period, in particular, currently 
available data do not allow us to separate manufacturing from the rest of the industrial sector. For the 
years between 1950 and 1989, substantial differences in industry classification between the three 
countries make such distinction similarly difficult. However, it is not just classification issues that 
pose a problem when it comes to setting out long-term patterns of industrial development: state 
borders changed after the First World War and with the formation of the three main successor states. 
In most cases, the new state-level borders were not drawn along pre-war region boundaries that 
typically identify the contemporary statistical units of observation.   
Quantitatively, we have three specific aims. First, we present near complete time-series on 
industrial production and compare them to the growth of gross domestic product (GDP). Second, we 
account for the level of industrialisation by establishing the share of industry and other major sectors 
of economic activity in the labour force. Third, we gather evidence on the changing composition of 
industrial output to show how the role of modern manufacturing industries evolved over time.  In this 
third task, we have to rely on data not entirely consistent between the pre-1914, inter-war, and post-
1950 periods. This limitation is determined by post-1918 border changes, inter-temporal changes in 
industry classifications and, in general, by the extent to which disaggregated data on industrial 
production are available. Our discussion of the evidence is, therefore, structured chronologically 
focussing on three main periods: 1870-1914, 1920-38, and 1950-89. In the final section we briefly 
consider the years following the fall of communism and draw general conclusions about the 
achievements of industrialisation in East Central Europe. 
 
 
I. Industrialisation in the Habsburg Empire: Diffusion and Concentration in the Late 
Nineteenth Century 
The process of industrialization in the Habsburg lands after 1870 evolved within the context of an 
empire-wide customs and monetary union and against the background of the 1867 constitutional 
settlement that established the Dual Monarchy. An increasingly dense railway network connected the 
regional centres of economic activity, stretching from the empire’s western border with Switzerland 
to its eastern border with Russia and from its northern border with Germany to the Mediterranean. 
The sheer geographical expanse of the empire brought with it a large degree of regional differences 
in broadly conceived resource endowments and in access to both domestic and foreign markets. These 
differences had a major impact on the location of industry and manufacturing in the empire and, by 
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extension, its successor states. The broader outlines of the spatial pattern of industrial activity that 
came to characterize the second half of the nineteenth century emerged over the previous hundred 
years or so. Four factors, in particular, shaped this regional pattern and its concomitant differentials 
in manufacturing activity. First, the western and north-western regions of the empire, i.e. those 
broadly corresponding with the territories of modern Austria and the Czech Republic, experienced 
the weakening of feudal institutions earlier than the more eastern regions, creating room for the rise 
of non-agricultural activity. It was here that domestic industry took hold first, that an entrepreneurial 
class emerged comparatively early, that foreign capital and expertise was attracted to and where, 
eventually, modern forms of manufacturing began to develop (Good 1984, pp.14-24).3 In 1790, 280 
manufacturing firms were counted in the empire (excluding Galicia, Vorarlberg and Tyrol), 50 per 
cent of these were located in Lower Austria and 30 per cent in Bohemia (ibid.) – foreshadowing the 
two regions’ pre-eminence in Austro-Hungarian manufacturing through to 1914, notwithstanding the 
changing composition of regional output over time. Second, at the time of initial industrialization the 
western and north-western regions of the empire were already significantly more urbanised than the 
rest of the country (ibid.), entailing agglomeration economies that were to intensify over the course 
of the nineteenth century.4 Third, by 1870 the Alpine and Czech lands had a huge lead in the stock of 
human capital, built up over the preceding decades: new estimates suggest that the difference in 
average years of schooling compared to the least advanced regions in the empire was equivalent to 
about two and a half years, or 60 (75) per cent of the average years of schooling for Imperial Austria 
(Hungary) as a whole.5 Finally, access to domestic and foreign purchasing power was crucial for the 
development of manufacturing and in this respect, too, industry in Alpine Austria and the Czech lands 
held an advantage over the more remote regions in the empire’s east. 
 
Table 5.2. Share of Manufacturing in Industrial, Sectoral and Aggregate Gross  
Value-Added (Per Cent) 
 Imperial Austria  Imperial Hungary  
                                                             
3 By the eighteenth century, Bohemia and Moravia had become centres of the textiles (linen, woollen) and glass industries, 
while an internationally significant mining and metallurgy sector was located in Styria, Upper Austria and Carinthia. In 
the 1760s, for instance, Styria alone produced as much pig iron as England (Good, 1984, pp.20-1). The production of 
textiles in the Alpine lands was in the main located in and around Vienna, Upper Austria and Vorarlberg.   
4 By 1880 (1910), the proportion of the population resident in towns with more than 10,000 inhabitants had reached 47 
(61) per cent in Lower Austria (including Vienna) and 10 (19) per cent in Bohemia (including Prague) compared to an 
average of 8 (14) per cent for the rest of Cisleithania; for the broader regions of Alpine Austria and the Czech lands the 
figures are 23 (34) and (10) 18 per cent, respectively. From the 1860s, Budapest became the major centre of Hungarian 
manufacturing. Here, too, a high initial degree of urbanization is observable: in 1870, the capital city alone accounted for 
14 per cent of the Danube-Tisza-Basin region’s; by 1910, this proportion had increased to 29 per cent. (Bolognese-
Leuchtenmüller, 1978, Table 14, pp.40-41; MSE 1895, 1913).   
5 New approximations of regional average years of schooling were derived using regional enrolment data and the 
coefficients from a regression of aggregate average years of schooling in Imperial Austria and Imperial Hungary on 
aggregate lagged enrolment; see Schulze and Fernandes (2009) for underlying data, methods and souces.  
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  industry 
secondary 
sector GDP   industry 
secondary 
sector GDP 
        
1870 96.0 63.9 19.2  89.0 58.6 6.5 
1890 93.1 65.5 21.0  90.8 59.5 9.7 
1913 91.9 66.6 24.8   89.2 62.3 14.1 
Gross value added in constant 1913 prices. 
Industry: manufacturing, mining, utilities. Secondary sector: industry, construction, crafts. 
Source: Schulze (2000), with some revisions. 
 
Manufacturing in both halves of the empire expanded at significantly higher rates than the 
aggregate economy. Table 5.2 shows that by 1913, almost one quarter of Imperial Austria’s GDP was 
generated in manufacturing, while in Imperial Hungary the proportion more than doubled from less 
than 7 per cent in 1870 to 14 per cent in 1913. This rise in manufacturing’s relative importance was 
the outcome of an uneven process of accelerations and decelerations in industrial activity and 
investment as well as changes in the output composition broadly in favour of ‘modern’ sectors such 
as metal-making, engineering and (petro-) chemicals. Between 1870 and 1913, manufacturing output 
in Austria grew by about 2.3 per cent per annum compared with 4.0 per cent for the much less 
industrialized Hungary. Yet the growth rates of manufacturing (or, more broadly, industrial) output 
in Austria and Hungary were out of phase with one another over the period (Table 5.3): this had to 
do with the effects of the 1873 Vienna stock market crash. The crash led to an outflow of Austrian 
capital to Hungary and was a key factor in prolonging sluggish growth in Austria whilst stimulating 
the first major wave of industrialization in the Hungarian lands (Komlos, 1983). The repatriation of 
capital to Austria in the early 1890s sustained the resumption of manufacturing and aggregate growth 
there and was associated with a slow-down in the Hungarian half of the empire. This pattern of 
deceleration and acceleration was closely associated with changes in investment demand for plant 
and equipment, that are apparent in the temporal evolution of domestic machinery output and changes 
in the gross stock of machinery (Schulze 1997, 2007a). The pre-1873 upswing in Habsburg 
manufacturing was fuelled by an expansion in the money supply to finance the wars with Prussia and 
Italy and a record Hungarian harvest in 1867/8 coming at a time of poor harvests elsewhere in Europe 
(Matis, 1972, pp. 153-161). Buoyant cereal and flour exports initiated a dramatic expansion in the 
empire’s railway network, providing a major stimulus to the domestic producer and capital goods 
industries that had developed in the western and north-western regions since the late eighteenth 
century. These industries – engineering and iron and steel, in particular – were located primarily in 
Alpine Austria and the Czech lands. As rural incomes rose in response to increasing grain and land 
prices, demand for consumer goods expanded and led to the installation of new productive capacity 
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in manufacturing. The associated growth in empire-wide demand for machinery provided a fillip not 
just to Austrian producers but also to Budapest’s nascent engineering industry.6 
 
Table 5.3. Annual Growth, Gross Valued Added (Per Cent)  










         
1871-      
1912 2.34 2.44 2.21 1.81 4.05 4.00 3.77 2.14 
 
1871-
1895 1.71 1.84 1.55 1.37 4.42 4.30 4.21 2.21 
 
1895-
1912 3.23 3.29 3.16 2.43 3.48 3.53 3.08 2.02 
Gross value-added in constant 1913 prices. 
Note: Peak-to-peak measurement. Since peaks in the individual series do not necessarily correspond exactly with 
one another, the periods of measurements are not always identical. 
Source: Appendix A, Table A.1. 
 
Austrian manufacturing output peaked in 1871.7 Yet what started out as the downswing 
following the expansionary phase of a regular business cycle was transformed into a major recession 
in industry under the impact of the 1873 crash which changed longer-term expectations and 
investment decisions. From the late 1870s Austrian investors, seeking safe assets, engaged in large-
scale purchases of new Hungarian debt. The Hungarian government was thus able to finance its 
regular expenditure and investment in infrastructure without crowding out private domestic investors 
(as much of the new debt was held in Austria). Further, the growth in Hungarian disposable incomes 
and in consumer demand was not constrained as the government was able to meet its fiscal targets 
without recourse to excessive taxation. This provided a major stimulus to both consumer and capital 
goods producers in a still largely agricultural economy. Hence, in Hungary the signs of depression 
were almost absent (despite a modest dip in activity in the 1870s). In Austria, though, the effects were 
rather different: ‘the diminished stock of venture capital had a negative impact on industrial 
production until the 1890s. By attracting large amounts of Austrian capital, the Hungarian economy 
was therefore influential in prolonging the depression in Austria’ (Komlos, 1983, p.218). The overall 
outcome was a painfully sluggish recovery in Austrian manufacturing from the 1873 trough through 
                                                             
6 See Schulze (1996) on the development of Hungary’s machine-building industry. 
7 According to Komlos’ (1983, Table E.4) index Austrian manufacturing grew by 8.7 per cent per annum during 1867-
1871 and 1.8 per cent for 1871-84. Whilst also showing a peak in 1871, the more comprehensive index documented 
here in Table A.1 increases by less than 1 per cent over the period. 
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to the mid-1880s and rapid expansion in Hungarian manufacturing into the late 1880s and early 1890s 
(Schulze 2000). 
As domestic demand began to pick up again in the second half of the 1880s, Austrian 
industrialists started installing new capacity again, going beyond mere replacement investment which 
had been characteristic of the preceding decade and a half. The beginning of this up-turn in the late 
1880s and early 1890s coincided with the reversal of intra-empire capital flows. Austrian investors 
turned to domestic industrial equity again (Somary, 1902, Table II, p. 39) and investment in industrial 
machinery was aided by a fall in Austrian long-term interest rates (Schulze, 1997). While the 
repatriation of Austrian capital was associated with a significant increase in Austrian manufacturing 
(GDP) growth of about 1.5 (1.1) percentage points over 1871-95, Hungary ‘suffered less’ than 
‘Austria gained’: growth in manufacturing declined by less than one percentage point and the 
observed decrease in GDP growth is probably within the margin of error (0.2 percentage points). We 
hypothesize that this had to do with, first, a much deeper and more sophisticated Hungarian domestic 
capital market than there was in the early 1870 as a result of significantly higher per capita incomes 
after more than twenty years of relatively fast economic growth; second, a shift into higher value-
added manufacturing branches, and, third, comparatively high productivity growth in agriculture that 
sustained disposable income growth and demand for manufactured goods in a still largely agricultural 
economy. Throughout the late nineteenth century, agriculture in Hungary had a substantial revealed 
comparative advantage in crop production. The sector benefited from ready access to the higher 
income markets in Austria that were largely uncontested by foreign importers due to the Habsburg 
customs union’s external tariff (Katus 1970, Komlos 1983).8 In addition, not only did crop production 
in Hungary lent itself more readily to mechanisation and machinery investment than most parts of the 
overall more mountainous and rugged Austria, but Hungary ran a trade surplus in both crops and 
livestock products with her customs union partner (Eddie, 1989).  
While textiles and iron were at the centre of early industrialization in the Alpine and Czech 
lands, the process of industrialization in Hungary was driven initially by the agricultural processing 
industries, especially flour milling (Good, 1984, pp. 125-148), which drew on a productive domestic 
rural sector as main source of its inputs. Yet the structure of manufacturing changed significantly in 
the later decades of the century in both parts of the empire and became more diversified. This raises 
the question to what extent shifts to ‘modern’ industries were associated with changes in overall 
manufacturing growth. Here we consider iron and steel production, engineering (including 
mechanical and electrical engineering as well as transport equipment) and chemicals as representative 
                                                             
8 Cf. Schulze (2007a) on comparative sectoral productivity growth. 
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of the ‘modern sector’.9 Of course, this is a simplification – technical change, product and process 
innovations occurred in other sectors, too. Table 5.4 sets out the comparative growth rates and the 
relative contributions to manufacturing growth made by the ‘modern sector’ compared to the rest of 
manufacturing branches. Three observations can be made: First, the ‘modern sector’ grew 
significantly faster than the rest of manufacturing in both Austria and Hungary. Second, this held over 
both periods under review. Third, the evidence for Austria-Hungary conforms broadly with the 
general finding that industrialization typically involved a growing share not only of manufacturing in 
aggregate output, but also of a rising weight of the ‘modern sectors’ in manufacturing as a whole. In 
Austria, the proportion of manufacturing growth attributable to the rise of the ‘modern sectors’ went 
up from less than 23 per cent (1871-95) to almost 40 per cent at a time of overall accelerating 
manufacturing growth. For Hungary, the corresponding figures are 17 per cent and 25 per cent, 
reflecting the overall less advanced state and structure of manufacturing in Transleithania.  
 
Table 5.4. Modern Manufacturing - Relative Contributions to Manufacturing Growth 
(Per Cent Per Annum) 













       
Imperial Austria 
       
1871-1895  2.73 1.51 0.39 1.32 1.72 
1895-1912  6.51 2.46 1.26 1.97 3.23 
       
Imperial Hungary 
       
1871-1895  7.57 4.08 0.77 3.65 4.42 
1895-1912   5.35 3.13 0.86 2.63 3.48 
Note: measurement from peak to peak in total manufacturing output. For each period, relative contributions to 
manufacturing growth are computed as each sector's growth rate weighted by that sector's share in 
manufacturing at the start of the period.  
Sources: See Table 5.2. 
       
Table 5.5 reveals some key structural characteristics of the Habsburg economy. First, 
throughout the period under review the empire as a whole remained a largely agricultural economy, 
especially so in its eastern, Hungarian half. For comparison, less than half of the labour force in 
                                                             
9 The category of non-engineering ‘metal-working’ industries, ranging from the production of nails and screws to metal 
furniture, has been excluded. 
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Germany was employed in agriculture in 1871 and by 1910 this proportion had fallen to less than 36 
per cent, while manufacturing’s share had risen to more than 29 per cent (Hoffmann, 1965).10 Note, 
however, that Imperial Austria had a significantly higher share of manufacturing (or, more broadly, 
industrial) employment in 1870 than its southern neighbour Italy and maintained a slight lead until 
the First World War (cf. Chapter 6, Table 6.2). Second, the picture looks distinctly different if the 
focus is on those territories that after the First World War became parts of either the Austrian Republic 
or Czechoslovakia. Here the shares of industry and manufacturing in total employment were far 
higher than on average across the empire, on a par with those prevalent in Germany and well above 
the corresponding figures for Italy.11 These data, then, confirm the notion of the Alpine and Czech 
regions as the industrial heartlands of the empire and as regions of industrial activity close to the 
European core. 
 
Table 5.5. Sectoral Composition of Labour Force (Per Cent) 
    1869/70 1890 1910 













        
agriculture 62.7 78.3 61.5 79.5 54.0 73.4 
Industry 18.1 7.1 19.9 8.0 22.6 11.8 
manufacturing 17.4 6.6 18.9 7.4 21.3 11.0 
mining 0.8 0.6 1.1 0.6 1.2 0.8 
utilities     0.1  
construction 2.2  2.4 0.9 3.3 1.5 
Services 17.0 14.6 16.1 11.6 20.1 13.3 
        
labour force (1000s) 10848.28 8248.48 12203.67 9121.60 14051.33 10732.56 
Source: Schulze (2007a) with some revisions. 
 
The level differences in manufacturing and industrial employment shares within Austria-
Hungary reflect the regionally differential timing and sectoral basis of industrialization across the 
empire.12 Hungary – whether in its imperial or modern guise – came late to the game. Here, 
                                                             
10 Note that Hoffmann’s (1965) figures refer to Germany in its pre-First World War rather than its post-1990 boundaries.  
In 1910, manufacturing (including crafts as for the Habsburg Empire) accounted for 29.1 per cent, mining for 2.8 per 
cent, utilities for 0.3 per cent and construction for 5.2 per cent of the total labour force.  
11 This assessment is grounded in new estimates for the successor states. They are based on the regional data underlying 
the reconstructed labour force estimates for Imperial Austria and Imperial Hungary and border adjustments; for sources 
and methods see Appendix A, Schulze (2007a).  For modern Austria and Czechoslovakia the share of the labour force in 
manufacturing moves from c. 22 per cent in 1870 to about 28 per cent in 1910; for Hungary, it moves from less than 9 to 
almost 15 per cent. Note that the 1910 figures deviate slightly from those presented in Table 5.8; this is mainly due to 
corrections in the estimated agricultural labour force for 1870-1910. 
12 See Table A.3 in the Appendix for a more detailed breakdown by manufacturing branches. 
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industrialization in earnest had started only during the 1860s and 1870s, aided by the inflow of 
Austrian funds after the 1873 stock market crash. Budapest (in the central Danube-Tisza Basin), in 
particular, but also the Hungarian regions on the Danube Left and Right Banks as well as the Tisza 
Right Bank became progressively more engaged in manufacturing over time. However, compared to 
Austria or Czechoslovakia, and even Imperial Austria as a whole, manufacturing played a markedly 
less prominent role in the Hungarian economy right up to the First World War. This is borne out by 
the evidence on both regional shares in manufacturing output and regional manufacturing output per 
head (Table 5.6). 
 
Table 5.6. Manufacturing Gross Value Added by Region (1990 GK-$) 
 
Clearly, the spatial distribution of manufacturing across the Habsburg Empire changed over time and 
broadly so in line with the gradual intra-empire catching-up of the Hungarian with the Austrian 
economy. By 1910, Budapest was firmly on the map as a major manufacturing location. Yet just as 
striking as this is persistence: in terms of manufacturing output per capita, the most industrialized 
1870 1910 1870 1910 1870 1910
Lower Austria 1,295          3,634       0.20      0.18       644.3     1,028.9   
Upper Austria 209             471         0.03      0.02       280.7     552.5      
Salzburg 41               111         0.01      0.01       266.6     516.6      
Styria 243             822         0.04      0.04       211.3     569.3      
Carinthia 52               154         0.01      0.01       152.9     389.9      
Carniola 47               154         0.01      0.01       98.8      293.0      
Littoral 101             423         0.02      0.02       166.2     473.2      
Tyrol/Voralbg. 172             500         0.03      0.03       191.8     458.0      
Bohemia 2,266          5,499       0.34      0.28       436.7     812.3      
Moravia 710             1,844       0.11      0.09       348.7     703.1      
Silesia 180             496         0.03      0.03       347.7     655.7      
Galicia 264             852         0.04      0.04       48.0      106.2      
Bukovina 24               79           0.00      0.00       47.2      99.1        
Dalmatia 7                60           0.00      0.00       15.1      92.4        
Danube Left Bank 138             542         0.02      0.03       79.8      249.2      
Danube Right Bank 178             585         0.03      0.03       73.3      189.8      
Danube-Tisza Basin 198             1,379       0.03      0.07       91.5      365.9      
Tisza Right Bank 105             408         0.02      0.02       69.9      230.4      
Tisza Left Bank 85               372         0.01      0.02       44.7      143.3      
Tisza-Maros Basin 93               394         0.01      0.02       52.9      184.0      
Transylvaina 105             482         0.02      0.02       48.5      180.1      
Croatia-Slavonia 62               418         0.01      0.02       33.1      156.6      
Imperial Austria 5,610          15,101     0.85      0.77       272.5     540.7      
Imperial Hungary 964             4,581       0.15      0.23       62.1      219.3      
Source: Revised estimates based on sources and methods documented in Schulze (2007 b).
Output (m.) Output per CapitaRegional Share
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regions in 1910 were still, by a large margin, Lower Austria and the Czech lands - just as they had 
been forty years earlier. In absolute terms, the per capita output lead of the established manufacturing 
regions over the others increased, even if it had marginally declined in percentage terms. Following 
New Economic Geography reasoning, regions’ access to domestic and foreign markets (here: 
transport and tariff-cost weighted GDPs of main trading partners) is a central candidate factor 
accounting for a good deal of inter-regional differences in manufacturing activity. Habsburg regions’ 
manufacturing output per head over 1870 to 1910 is indeed strongly associated with access to the 
home and European markets.13 Further, regional differences in human capital endowments (average 
years of schooling) are strongly associated with regional differences in manufacturing output per 
head.14 The critical issue here is the interaction between the two. The evidence would suggest that 
those regions that were comparatively well endowed with human capital were in a significantly better 
position to exploit their market potential, i.e. to realize benefits of economies of scale and 
specialization related to market size. The regions in the landlocked and remote east of the empire (e.g. 
Galicia, the Bukovina or Transylvania) were not only disadvantaged in terms of their limited access 
to Habsburg or foreign markets, they were also constrained by previous generations’ lack of 
investment in schooling. The southern coastal regions had a large market potential because of their 
cost advantages of sea transportation to growing foreign markets but, in the case of Dalmatia or 
Croatia-Slavonia, poor schooling of the labour force. There was, then, little incentive for 
manufacturers to locate in these regions despite their favourable position in terms of market access. 
Where the human capital stock was higher, the response to the opportunities afforded by better market 
access was stronger as demonstrated by the region around Trieste (Littoral). Although enrolment rates 
rose faster in the least developed parts of the empire than in the more advanced regions (where levels 
were, by Habsburg standards, already relatively high), it took considerable time before that would 
feed into increases in average years of schooling. Those parts of the Habsburg Empire that were 
characterized by initially high levels of schooling, Alpine Austria and the Czech lands, were still well 
in the lead by 1910. Stark inter-regional differences in education investment prior to the 1870s had a 
lasting impact on regions’ relative performance in manufacturing up to the First World War. 
II. Industrialisation on hold: Central Europe between the Wars 
If John Maynard Keynes was correct in arguing that the economic consequences of the peace after 
World War I were detrimental for Germany, then their impact beyond Germany’s eastern borders can 
be branded catastrophic. Unlike the territory of post-war Poland, Austria, Czechoslovakia and 
                                                             
13 On the underlying Harries-type market potential measures for the Habsburg regions see Schulze (2007b). 
14 See footnote 5 above on the construction of regional average years of schooling measures. 
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Hungary witnessed little, if any, destruction due to war activity. The only exception is the brief 
conflict between the short-lived Bolshevik regime in Hungary and the Petite Entente formed of 
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania that ended with the Romanian occupation of most of 
Hungary in 1920. Still, the post-war settlement dislocated the economies of Central Europe. The 
dissolution of the Habsburg Empire severely limited access to markets and resources for industrial 
firms both within and beyond the pre-1914 borders (Teichova, 1985, pp. 223-227). 
Different regions of the empire had not differed solely in their level of industrialisation but also 
in what branches of manufacturing they had specialised in. Thus, the new borders, coupled with the 
animosity of the new nation states towards their neighbours, implied much-reduced market potential 
for many industries and the breakdown of crucial input-output linkages between firms. The milling 
industry of Budapest, the textile and clothing industry in Austria, or machine-tool producers in 
Bohemia and Moravia did not only face difficulties in accessing their once most important markets 
but also in securing the necessary intermediate inputs. Although, as recent research has revealed, the 
negative impact of economic nationalism on market integration was already felt before World War I, 
it became devastating after 1918 (Schulze and Wolf, 2011, pp. 652-673). As shown in Table A.2 in 
the appendix, the decline in industrial output across the war was comparable to, and in the case of 
Austria was even greater than, that of GDP – in a period when the rate of industrialisation was on the 
rise in rest of the global periphery.  
Between the wars, industrial expansion was very moderate in Central Europe and it showed a 
path quite similar to what the literature has described for Germany and most of the advanced western 
economies. Following a relatively successful stabilisation that brought an end to hyperinflation in 
Austrian and Hungary and restored state finances by 1924, all three countries recovered quickly until 
1929. Industrial production grew by 4.5 per cent in Austria and by 8 per cent in Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary annually. However, approximately half of this growth was lost during the Great Depression, 
which in both Austria and Czechoslovakia affected the manufacturing sector more strongly than the 
rest of the economy. In both countries, the slump was prolonged by political forces. While extreme 
political fractionalisation leading to civil war tormented Austria, the government in Prague tried 
policies of import substitution as well as maintaining the gold standard of the crown, which continued 
to have a deflationary effect until the mid-1930s. Furthermore, the export-oriented nature of Czech 
industry and its relative success to replace exports to the former empire to exports to other markets 
in the 1920s made it more susceptible to shocks in international trade (Drabek 1985, page 408, 429-
430). Indeed, Czech industry was hit hard by rising tariffs and administrative trade barriers that 
emerged across Europe during and after the Great Depression (Pryor et al., 1971, pp. 35-59, Drabek, 
1985, pp. 432-433). As a result, industrial output remained well below 1929 levels until 1937.  
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Between 1938 and 1943, the expansion of the Nazi war economy gave a large impetus to 
industrial growth in Central Europe, particularly in the territories annexed by Hitler in 1938. In the 
first two years after the Anschluss, the Austrian economy grew by more than 30 per cent, industry by 
more than a half, reflecting the priority assigned to war preparations (Butschek, 1978, p. 65). After 
the announcement of rearmament in 1938, Hungary also experienced a growth spurt driven by 
industrial expansion. While total employment in the economy remained constant until 1943, it 
climbed from 330 thousand to 451 thousand in manufacturing, leading to a 37 per cent increase in 
industrial production (Ránki, 1964, p. 225; Berend and Ránki, 1960, p. 140). Recent research has 
revealed the staggering growth of German imports from the region after 1939, with particularly large 
increases from Austria and the annexed Czech lands (Scherner, 2011, pp. 79-113). Consequently, 
wartime industrial expansion focussed primarily on mining and the primary metal industries as well 
as machinery and armaments. 
In terms of structural development, the region did not witness much action during the interwar 
period. Industrialisation was put on hold; the occupational distribution of the labour force remained 
almost unchanged in all three countries, as reported in Table 10. The most important factor holding 
back structural modernisation was that agricultural productivity remained very modest, due to the 
lack of technological innovation, the slow spread of chemical fertilizers, and low mechanisation. 
Thus, the farming sector had limited potential to release labour, further aggravated by the pro-agrarian 










Table 5.7 Economically Active Population by Sector (Per Cent)      
 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2008 
Hungary            
Agriculture 55.8 58.2 54.2 50.0 51.8 38.1 25.0 18.4 15.3 8.4 4.9 
Industry 19.4 18.1 21.7 23.2 23.6 34.8 44.7 43.9 39.7 36.8 35.5 
Services 24.8 23.7 24.1 26.8 24.6 27.1 30.3 37.7 45.0 54.8 59.6 
Austria*            
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Agriculture 39.5 39.9 37.5 39.0 34.3 23.7 14.8 9.9 8.0 6.2 5.7 
Industry 31.0 33.3 34.5 32.4 36.1 46.4 43.0 42.2 38.4 31.7 27.0 
Services 29.5 26.8 28.0 28.6 29.7 29.9 42.2 47.9 53.6 62.1 67.3 
Czechoslovakia            
Agriculture 42.0 39.6 37.5  37.8 25.7 16.9 13.3 12.8 6.3 3.4 
Industry 34.1 33.8 35.7  37.5 46.1 48.3 49.3 45.6 45.0 39.1 
Services 23.9 26.6 26.8   24.7 28.3 34.8 37.4 41.6 48.8 57.5 
 * The entry for 1920 reflects 1923 data, that for 1930 is an estimate based on 1934 figures and sectoral growth rates. 
Sources: Austria - Butschek (2001, p. 163); Czechoslovakia Teichova (1988, p. 9); Hungary - Eckstein (1955); for all 
countries after 1950: ILO (1986) and FAOSTAT Classic 
(http://faostatclassic.fao.org/site/550/DesktopDefault.aspx?PageID=550#ancor). 
 
The literature, however, has pointed to several other constraints on industrial expansion. 
Teichova emphasised the shortage of skilled labour, which was a crucial limiting factor of 
manufacturing growth in a period when European industry still heavily relied on craft production 
methods (Teichova, 1988, pp. 21-22). Eckstein stressed the decline in capital investment from the 
pre-1914 period, and more so after 1929, which increased the technological lag vis-à-vis advanced 
western nations (Eckstein, 1955, p. 220). As shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2 respectively, without 
sufficient investment in new equipment the main drivers of technological modernisation in the 
interwar period, electrification and motorization, made very little progress in Central Europe. This 
relative backwardness was not only noticeable in comparison with the United States but also with 
Germany, and it became more pronounced during the 1930s.   
 
(Figures 1 and 2 here) 
 
In an environment increasingly characterised by resource scarcity and trade protectionism, 
industrialisation had several common features across Central Europe: industrial concentration to 
achieve economies of scale, cartelisation to secure preferential access to markets and foreign 
technology, and product specialisation to exploit market potential in niche areas. Both in 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary, the growth of industrial production was driven by the expansion of 
large-scale enterprise in primary metals, chemicals and engineering. The three largest metallurgical 
companies in Czechoslovakia increased their share in steel production from 65 per cent in 1921 to 90 
per cent by 1936 and owned all the export quotas allocated to the country in the International Steel 
Cartel (Teichova, 1988, pp. 40-41). In Hungary, the leading firms in the electro-technical industry 
and railway engineering managed to increase their global market share despite shrinking domestic 
demand. They achieved this by integrating into German-led international cartels and by concentrating 
on very specialised products, such lamp and radio parts, or diesel multiple units  used on small 
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railways in remote regions around the world (Hidvégi and Vonyó, 2012, pp. 61-62). By contrast, the 
more traditional branches of manufacturing, such as the milling industry in Hungary, or the sugar 
industry in Bohemia faced relative decline. Between 1924 and 1937, the share of metals, chemicals 
and engineering products in total industrial output in Czechoslovakia increased from 22.6 per cent to 
31.7 per cent (Teichova, 1988, p. 34). The same level of disaggregation is not possible for Hungary, 
but the statistical evidence shows that while the contribution of mining, smelting, handicraft 
production and construction to national product did not change between 1924 and 1938, the share of 
manufacturing (which did not include metallurgy and construction materials) increased from 15.5 per 
cent to 21.4 per cent (Eckstein, 1955, p. 171).  
Despite the overall sluggish industrialization of East Central Europe, the region recorded some 
examples of the implementation of modern productivity-enhancing technologies, though they were 
exceptions rather than the general rule. The best known case is the Baťa works in Zlín, the leading 
concern in the Czechoslovak shoe-making industry. The introduction of advanced American mass 
production techniques between 1924 and 1927 achieved a dramatic productivity increase that lasted 
into the early 1930. Shoe production jumped from 8.9 million pairs in 1926 to 15.2 million pairs in 
1927 while employment expanded by ‘only’ 35 per cent in the same year. Between 1930 and 1933, 
average weekly output per worker increased from 37 to 48 pairs and Czechoslovakia became one of 
the world’s leading exporters of footwear (Teichova, 1985, pp. 275-276).   
 
 
III. Planned industrialisation in a state-managed economy 
If the consequences of World War I were catastrophic for Central Europe, the impact of World War 
II was apocalyptic. Hostilities on the eastern front brought unprecedented destruction. The temporary 
demise of the German economy and the East-West tensions emerging from the post-war settlement 
untied the input-output linkages between the region’s industries. These were partially still the legacy 
of industrial development in the Habsburg Empire before 1914, but even more the product of Nazi 
economic imperialism. From the mid-1930s, German foreign policy considered the region as its 
natural backwater and tied its economies increasingly to the Third Reich through bilateral trade 
agreements. The economic dependence on Germany increased further during the war, especially for 
the territories temporarily annexed by the Third Reich.15 By late 1945, in Austria and Hungary, 
industrial production plummeted to levels that had already been surpassed by 1900 (see Tables A.1 
and A.2). However, the most detrimental economic outcome of the war was the immense loss it had 
                                                             
15 See Hirschman (1945), Ránki (1983), and Grenzebach (1988) among others. 
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caused in human resources. Besides the innumerable military and civilian casualties, more than a 
million Jews who had resided in the three countries before 1939 perished in the Holocaust. Lastly, one 
needs to account for the expulsion of minority Germans from East and Central Europe after 1945, in 
accordance with the Potsdam Agreement. Of the 16 million voluntarily fled or uprooted between 1944 
and 1950, 3 million were expelled from Czechoslovakia and 210 thousand from Hungary. Most of 
the expellees were deported to post-war Germany, many died in the process, and 370 thousand settled 
in Austria (Reichling, 1989, p. 26).  
While these deportations featured prominently in the literature on the post-war West German 
economy, their impact has been largely ignored in the economic history of Eastern Europe. The 
combined effect of wartime casualties, including the permanently wounded and the mentally 
debilitated, and the post-war settlement was enormous. Austria and Hungary witnessed practically no 
population growth between 1939 and 1950. The population of Czechoslovakia within its post-1945 
borders declined in the same period from 14.7 million to 12.4 million (Maddison, 2006, pp. 416, 474-
475). The Sudetenland was largely depopulated and thus important industrial districts had lost a vast 
share of their pre-war labour force.16 Across Central Europe, the war had left behind an ill-balanced 
demographic structure with a notable shortage of able-bodied young and middle-aged men, who 
traditionally constituted the backbone of the industrial workforce. The Holocaust and the expulsion 
of minority Germans, in particular, together with substantial emigration in the bourgeois middle class 
bequeathed upon the tormented nations of Central Europe a plethora of industrial and commercial 
assets without owners and without the necessary skills and entrepreneurial know-how to operate 
them.  
To rebuild and re-organise the war-shattered and dislocated economies required state 
management, which materialised already under the national-unity governments during the late 1940s, 
and under Allied military occupation in Austria. Popular land reforms were followed by large-scale 
nationalisation in industry. By 1948, all large enterprises and most middle-size firms were brought 
under state control; private property only continued to prevail in handcraft production. The state-
managed economy operated with fixed prices and wages and through the centralised allocation of 
resources, including both material inputs and investment. Even in Austria, most assets in heavy 
industry, public transport and utilities were publicly owned, and the rest of the economy was subjected 
to tremendous red tape. From the immediate post-war years, governments in all three countries 
                                                             
16 The border region with Germany produced about 55 per cent of Czechoslovak hard coal, 93 per cent of brown coal, 61 
per cent of textiles, 38 per cent of chemicals, 45 per cent of stone and clay products, and 30 per cent of engineering 




pursued autarchic industrialisation policies with extensive planning. While central planning was 
never introduced in Austria, she served as the canonical example of a managed mixed economy 
(Berend, 1997, pp. 72-82; Seidel, 2005). 
In many ways, in the early post-war period, Central Europe followed a similar path to that of 
Latin American countries during their flirtation with import-substituting industrialisation. In Austria, 
multiple exchange rates and targeted industrial subsidies were used to improve the competitiveness 
of domestic manufacturing. Although forced industrialisation in socialist command economies 
applied other tools to steer economic development that often reflected military-strategic motives, it 
also aimed at creating industrial self-sufficiency and accelerating the process of structural change. 
However, from the late 1950s, industrialisation in Central Europe owed much less to the East-West 
arms race than in the Soviet Union. According to data published by the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI), military spending in Czechoslovakia and Hungary rarely surpassed 3 per 
cent of GDP between 1957 and 1989.17  
In establishing the quantitative record of socialist industrialisation we need to treat official 
output data with more than a modicum of suspicion. Government statistics were distorted to a large 
but non-quantifiable extent. Physical output indicators are considered comparatively trustworthy, but 
aggregates expressed in value terms reflect unrealistic producer prices, incorrect weighting inasmuch 
as industry was always attributed a higher than actual share in net material product, and inappropriate 
methods employed in the computation of index numbers.18 Thankfully, independent western research 
revised official figures using data on physical output indicators exclusively and applying western 
accounting standards. The most substantial work was carried out by the Research Project on National 
Income in East Central Europe under the leadership of Thad P Alton. A long series of publications 
report index numbers on GNP by sector of origin of product and industrial value added for six 
countries including Czechoslovakia and Hungary. We use these data to determine the composition of 
gross value added and of industrial production using the same industry classifications and compare 
these results with statistics on Austria and Germany.  
Economic growth in Central Europe after 1945 was industry-driven. From its post-war nadir, 
industrial production recovered to pre-1939 levels by 1950 and grew rapidly for another two decades, 
significantly faster than the rest of the economy. In all three countries, industrial value added 
measured in constant prices doubled during the 1950s and tripled between 1950 and 1970 (see Table 
A.2). In fact, industrialisation reached its peak only in the 1960s and 1970s when industry and 
                                                             
17 SIPRI, Yearbook, diff. vols. 
18 Net Material Product was the national accounting concept used by CMEA countries. It is conceptually similar to 
GDP, but excludes services deemed unproductive, especially housing and the government. 
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construction employed well over 40 per cent of the labour force, as shown in Table 10. By contrast, 
the share of agricultural employment declined to less than half of its initial level during the post-war 
golden age. In Czechoslovakia and Hungary, industry remained the largest sector of the economy 
until the late 1980s. 
 
Table 5.8. Share of industry* in gross value-added in 1975 prices (%) 
 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 
Austria 27.3 28.7 29.2 30.0 28.7 31.5 
Czechoslovakia 26.4 35.9 38,6 40.7 34.6 37.1 
Hungary 24.8 32.4 32.4 33.8 35.0 39.6 
Germany 32.5 34.9 35.2 33.4 27.5 27.1 
* Mining, manufacturing and utilities 
Source: Own calculations based on data from G. Lazarcik (1969),  Czirják (1973), Alton et al. (1982), Alton et al. (1991), 
and from DIW (Germany), WIFO (Austria), and EU KLEMS (www.euklems.net). 
 
Table 11 demonstrates the impact of forced industrialisation in the 1950s and early 1960s in a 
comparative perspective. The share of industrial value-added in GDP increased significantly faster in 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary than in Austria and Germany (GDR and Federal Republic combined). 
After 1968, when moderate economic reforms relaxed authoritarian controls and introduced greater 
flexibility for enterprise management, industrial growth slowed down considerably. However, while 
the rate of industrialisation was declining in Germany after the oil shocks, it continued to increase 
until the mid-1980s in Central Europe. East of the Iron Curtain, this was largely the consequence of 
the slow development of the service sector. In Austria, it reflected more the overheating of industrial 
growth by ever-increasing state subsidies that began to rock the federal budget by the 1980s and 





Table 5.9. The composition of gross industrial value-added* in current prices (%) 
 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 
 Heavy industry 
Austria 27.3 28.7 29.2 30.0 28.7 31.5 
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Czechoslovakia 26.4 35.9 38,6 40.7 34.6 37.1 
Hungary 24.8 32.4 32.4 33.8 35.0 39.6 
Germany 32.5 34.9 35.2 33.4 27.5 27.1 
 Modern manufacturing 
Austria   48.3 52.6 54.5 61.2 
Czechoslovakia 56.3 58.4 57.4 63.8 53.4 62.4 
Hungary 47.5 53.8 52.4 57.5 55.0 72.2 
Germany 52.8 59.3 64.3 68.8 68.4 75.4 
* Mining and manufacturing 
Note: Heavy industry includes mining, construction materials, chemicals, primary metals, and engineering products. 
Modern manufacturing includes only chemicals, primary metals, and engineering products. 
Source: Own calculations based on data from Staller (1975), Czirják (1968), Alton et al. (1991), and from DIW 
(Germany), WIFO (Austria), and EU KLEMS (www.euklems.net). 
 
Post-war data give us a deeper insight into the structural development of the economy and thus 
the nature of industrialisation than what we have been able to establish for earlier periods. Table 12 
shows that the share of heavy industry and of modern manufacturing in gross industrial value added 
was similar across the region, but mining and the production of basic materials remained more 
important in Czechoslovakia and Hungary than in Austria and Germany. Whereas the share of modern 
manufacturing increased throughout the period in Austria and Germany, it stagnated in the two 
socialist countries from the late 1960s onward. This accords with the existing evidence pointing 
towards a growing technological lag between western nations and centrally planned economies after 
the golden age.19 This pattern is commonly attributed to inefficient resource allocation and the 
ideologically driven preference for material production over services.20 Additionally, the austerity 
policies introduced to combat the budgetary effects of rising oil prices and the debt crises that emerged 
in the 1980s (as a consequence of lavish borrowing during the 1970s and the worsening terms of trade 
after 1980) also led to a reduction in investment levels, particularly investment in new machinery. 
 In terms of growth, Central European economies performed similarly to other peripheral 
regions in Europe, with some notable exceptions. As in Southern Europe and as in other countries 
within the Soviet bloc, the growth of industrial production slowed down considerably from the 1970s 
and was disrupted by a temporary slump in the early 1980s. From the 1960s onward, Central Europe 
was lagging behind Southern Europe in terms of average growth rates, and from the mid-1970s 
Austria was also pulling away from Hungary and Czechoslovakia. During the golden age, average 
                                                             
19 See among others Kalecki (1993), and Broadberry and Klein (2011). 
20 The perhaps most elegant exposition of this view is by Kalecki (1993). 
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rates of industrial expansion were also lower than in South-East Europe, which provides evidence for 
convergence within the Soviet bloc. After 1980, however, this process of convergence broke down: 
typically the most advanced socialist economies performed best, both in terms of aggregate growth 
and industrial development.  
In Russia (not the whole Soviet Union), the increased price of hydrocarbons created new 
opportunities for growth in heavy industry, not least thanks to investment in natural gas exploration 
and in new transcontinental pipelines.21 In Czechoslovakia and Hungary, growth could be maintained 
because the relatively more advanced economic structure of both countries made them more resistant 
to (although by no means unaffected by) the exogenous shocks of the early 1980s. Given that modern 
branches of manufacturing, such as electrical engineering, and services carved out a relatively larger 
share from their GDP, they were hit less severely by the oil shocks than the less developed socialist 
economies. Czechoslovakia and Hungary were also much less affected by the debt crises of the 1980s 
than Poland or South-East Europe. Since, unlike virtually every other socialist country, 
Czechoslovakia did not borrow extensively during the 1970s, it did not need to tighten the belt after 
borrowing costs rocketed following the second oil shock. Hungary would have had to, but it joined 
the IMF in 1982 (in a secret operation without the prior knowledge of the Soviet leadership), which 
improved her position as a debtor.22 By contrast, Poland and Romania suffered prolonged depressions 
under severe austerity imposed by the repressive governments of General Jaruzelski and Nicolae 
Ceaușescu respectively; and, even if to a lesser extent, austerity also had harsh economic 
consequences in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.  
 
IV. The legacy of industrialisation: Central Europe after 1990 
The collapse of the Soviet bloc and the socialist economic system caused a major depression in 
Eastern Europe, affecting both Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Between 1987 and 1992, industrial 
production declined by 37 per cent and 28 per cent in the two countries respectively. In 
Czechoslovakia, the reduction in value-added was more than twice as large in mining and 
manufacturing as in the entire economy. Austrian industry initially received a boost from the opening 
of eastern markets and German reunification, in particular, but this boom was short lived and turned 
into recession in 1991. From the mid-1990s, Central Europe enjoyed strong growth that, not unlike 
in earlier periods, was propelled by industrial expansion (see Table A.2).   
                                                             
21 Hence the faster growth in total GDP in Russia (see Ponomarenko, 2002, p. 151) than in the U.S.S.R. as a whole (see 
Maddison, 2006) after 1980.   
22 For a more detailed narrative, see Berend (1997), pp.195 ff. 
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Transition to a market economy delivered first a killer blow and then a blessing for Central 
European industry. The liberalization of markets, the removal of import restrictions and the 
introduction of hard budget constrains finally exposed the inefficiency of state industries, leading to 
a sharp fall in output and employment. In subsequent years, however, privatization and the massive 
inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) led to technological modernization and the rationalization 
of production. Industry-level data reported by the EU KLEMS project shows that productivity growth 
since 1995 has stemmed largely from modern manufacturing, the strongly export-oriented 
engineering industries in particular, where most FDI has been concentrated. The timing of industrial 
development was quite the opposite of what Joan Roses describes for the Iberian economies. Since 
the launching of the Euro, comparative advantage in manufacturing has shifted from Southern to 
Central Europe. The growth impact of FDI was most noticeable in the automobile industry and 
electrical engineering, in which the Czech and Slovak Republics as well as Hungary emerged as major 
exporters within just a few years.   
The quantitative evidence on structural change also reveals the relative importance of 
manufacturing in the growth of Central European economies. Albeit declining since the late 1980s, 
the share of industry in the labour force has remained considerably higher in the former 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary than in Austria (see Table 10). As shown in Table 11, the industrial 
share in gross value added has even increased in Hungary, where privatisation and the liberalization 
of capital markets were completed much faster than in the Czech and Slovak Republics that pursued 
a more gradual reform program and thus did not attract as much manufacturing FDI before the late 
1990s. In recent years, Central Europe has experienced a period of re-industrialisation and, if fact, 
become proportionally more industrialised than Germany. Table 12 also reveals the impact of shifting 
comparative advantages on the structure of industrial production. The share of heavy industry and, to 
a lesser extent, of modern manufacturing in gross industrial value-added declined sharply following 
the fall of communism. By 2005, these shares have attained, or even surpassed, their highest previous 
levels; nevertheless the share of modern manufacturing in Central Europe has continued to lag behind 
Germany.     
Although transition to a market economy has radically improved the development prospects of 
manufacturing in both Hungary and the former Czechoslovakia, they are still tormented by some 
legacies of socialism. The weakness of domestic small and medium sized enterprises remains the 
main problem for industrial policy. Whereas FDI helped modernise, restructure and often reposition 
large firms, small companies have had limited access to credit to finance investment in new 
equipment and lack both the technical and industry-specific entrepreneurial knowhow necessary to 
face up to the challenges of a new globalised market environment. The legacy of state management 
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has also been manifested in the response governments in the region have typically given to this key 
problem. Tax concessions and direct subsidies to small enterprises alongside strategic agreements 
with foreign multinationals offering indirect subsidies in exchange for self-imposed limitations on 
the share of imported inputs did not reduce the technological backwardness and lack of know-how 
that keep limiting the growth potential of domestic firms.  
Nevertheless, Central European economies withered the storms of the transition shock more 
successfully than most other post-socialist countries, particularly the former Soviet and Yugoslav 
republics. This can only be explained by the confluence of several factors. Both their geographical 
vicinity to core European markets, particularly Germany, and their relatively rich endowments of 
skilled labour, but also their strong commitments to market reforms from the early 1990s, made 
Central European countries initially more attractive to western investors than East and South-East 
Europe. Czechoslovakia and Hungary, together with Poland, had already been way ahead most other 
socialist countries in economic reforms during the 1970s and 1980s. However, the comparatively 
much larger negative impact that the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the violent break-up of 
the former Yugoslavia had on Eastern and South-East Europe during the early 1990s cannot be 
overlooked.  
The quantitative evidence presented in this chapter allows us to derive several conclusions 
about the history of industrialisation in Central Europe. First, the region stepped into the industrial 
age before most of the global periphery, but it has not been able to narrow the developmental gap vis-
à-vis the West European core. Second, economic growth in the region has been and still is industry-
driven: periods of strong growth were marked by even faster industrial expansion, whereas the major 
calamities of the twentieth century, the world wars and the collapse of state socialism, dislocated 
industry more than other sectors of economic activity. Economic development in Central European 
countries during the last one hundred years has been shaped by these major calamities, and their 
response was always strongly linked to industrialisation and industrial modernization. Third, growth 
in the contribution of industry to gross value added was in strong correlation with the rising share of 
heavy industry and especially the modern branches of manufacturing in industrial production. Finally, 
industrialisation in Central Europe has always been characterised with more direct state involvement 
than in the most advanced western economies. In this aspect, Gerschenkron was right: under relative 
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Table A.1. Indices of Gross Value-Added (constant 1913 prices, 1913 = 100) 










         
1870 35.4 33.9 36.9 45.8 19.0 19.1 20.3 41.4 
1871 41.1 39.2 42.8 48.7 20.6 20.8 23.1 40.5 
1872 40.4 38.6 41.9 48.4 19.4 19.8 22.4 40.1 
1873 36.4 35.0 37.5 46.4 19.6 19.9 21.3 39.7 
1874 36.9 35.6 37.5 48.2 20.1 20.1 20.2 39.3 
1875 37.5 36.2 39.0 48.7 18.3 18.5 17.9 39.7 
1876 37.4 36.0 38.6 48.8 17.5 18.0 17.4 38.4 
1877 38.2 36.9 39.4 50.2 19.5 19.8 19.2 42.5 
1878 38.4 37.1 38.6 51.3 24.7 24.5 23.3 43.3 
1879 38.8 37.6 39.4 49.7 22.9 22.8 21.9 43.5 
1880 37.8 36.8 38.6 49.9 22.3 22.6 23.2 45.8 
1881 42.2 41.0 42.8 52.4 26.9 26.7 28.0 49.8 
1882 44.0 42.7 44.6 53.0 33.0 32.3 34.7 55.8 
1883 45.7 44.5 46.2 54.1 37.2 36.3 41.1 54.9 
1884 46.7 45.4 48.7 56.0 37.3 36.5 41.5 56.6 
1885 43.2 42.3 44.0 54.7 37.7 36.8 41.2 56.9 
1886 43.3 42.4 44.6 55.3 36.2 35.4 40.8 55.5 
1887 47.5 46.4 49.0 58.0 37.0 36.2 39.9 58.1 
1888 46.6 45.9 48.9 58.0 41.8 40.7 44.9 60.1 
1889 48.2 47.5 49.7 58.0 39.1 38.5 43.5 56.8 
1890 51.0 50.3 51.8 60.3 41.2 40.4 43.1 59.9 
1891 53.1 52.3 54.2 61.4 47.1 45.9 48.5 62.6 
1892 54.1 53.1 54.3 62.9 47.6 46.5 47.2 61.6 
1893 56.9 56.0 57.7 63.3 56.4 54.6 57.6 66.4 
1894 59.6 58.6 60.2 66.6 56.9 55.4 59.2 64.7 
1895 61.8 60.7 61.9 67.5 59.8 58.3 63.6 71.6 
1896 62.1 61.1 63.1 68.2 60.9 59.7 64.6 71.1 
1897 64.6 63.7 66.1 69.4 57.2 56.6 62.3 65.9 
1898 68.3 67.3 70.1 73.4 57.5 57.2 60.8 70.8 
1899 69.3 68.4 70.9 75.0 62.0 61.4 65.2 73.9 
1900 69.4 68.5 70.8 74.6 61.8 61.5 65.0 75.0 
1901 70.4 69.7 71.7 76.4 56.4 56.6 58.2 72.7 
1902 74.0 73.0 75.1 78.4 60.8 60.4 62.0 77.1 
1903 74.6 73.7 75.7 78.8 64.2 63.6 64.8 80.7 
1904 76.7 76.0 77.6 80.1 62.8 62.6 64.2 70.8 
1905 79.3 78.5 79.9 84.4 67.1 67.0 68.7 80.2 
1906 85.4 84.5 86.6 88.5 76.7 76.0 77.3 89.1 
1907 92.0 91.4 91.7 91.7 78.6 77.9 80.2 84.7 
1908 94.5 94.3 94.7 93.9 79.7 79.4 82.0 86.2 
1909 95.4 95.4 96.2 95.1 84.6 84.3 86.6 89.4 
1910 94.4 94.3 95.2 94.8 89.3 89.0 90.3 95.3 
1911 99.5 98.9 98.8 96.6 95.9 95.4 94.8 94.2 
1912 106.1 105.3 105.1 101.5 105.3 104.0 105.0 100.7 
1913 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 




Table A.2. Indices of Gross Value-Added (constant prices, 1950 = 100) 
  Hungary Austria Czechoslovakia 
  Industry GDP Industry GDP Industry GDP 
1913 37.1 71.0 84.3 91.2 48.7 64.0 
       
1920 30.0 58.7 49.4 60.6 42.5 57.9 
1921 30.0  54.4 67.1 45.5 62.5 
1922   60.0 73.1 43.1 60.9 
1923   59.9 72.4 47.5 65.9 
1924 35.2 68.0 68.6 80.7 60.3 72.8 
1925 38.5 73.1 75.3 86.2 69.3 81.3 
1926 42.2 78.3 77.0 87.7 68.6 81.0 
1927 47.2 81.7 78.6 90.3 76.5 87.1 
1928 51.2 88.9 83.8 94.5 84.8 94.8 
1929 51.2 91.8 85.6 95.9 90.3 97.4 
1930 48.3 89.8 79.9 93.2 86.2 94.2 
1931 44.5 85.4 71.9 85.8 80.1 91.0 
1932 41.2 83.2 63.8 76.9 67.7 87.4 
1933 43.5 90.7 60.7 74.4 64.0 83.6 
1934 49.5 91.3 62.5 75.0 64.9 80.4 
1935 56.8 95.9 64.7 76.5 66.9 79.7 
1936 64.6 102.3 65.7 78.7 73.6 86.2 
1937 67.0 100.0 70.2 82.9 84.3 95.9 
1938 70.5 105.2 82.8 93.5   
1939 80.3 113.1 107.6 106.0   
1946 32.3 67.2 47.2 53.3   
1947 49.3 69.5 54.3 58.8   
1948 66.3 87.0 72.4 74.8 88.3 87.9 
1949 78.1 94.0 86.6 89.0 91.9 92.7 
1950 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1951 113.1 109.7 114.5 106.8 102.8 101.8 
1952 129.9 113.4 115.2 106.9 104.3 105.2 
1953 136.9 115.4 117.2 111.6 105.2 104.8 
1954 141.8 119.5 133.8 123.0 109.3 109.1 
1955 152.4 130.3 161.4 136.6 122.7 118.4 
1956 139.3 124.4 174.7 146.0 133.3 125.4 
1957 154.6 134.7 183.7 154.9 146.8 133.1 
1958 170.3 143.7 187.0 160.6 162.9 143.2 
1959 183.2 149.5 195.8 165.1 175.7 149.5 
1960 198.9 157.3 216.8 178.7 191.6 160.8 
1961 216.8 165.3 227.3 188.2 203.9 167.2 
1962 232.0 172.2 232.8 192.8 213.3 169.5 
1963 243.1 181.6 241.7 200.6 212.3 166.3 
1964 261.1 191.8 260.5 212.7 217.3 174.1 
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1965 275.9 193.3 271.2 218.8 230.7 180.5 
1966 295.6 204.3 284.3 231.1 234.1 188.3 
1967 305.3 216.1 287.5 238.1 249.1 196.4 
1968 311.3 218.7 305.7 248.7 253.3 205.5 
1969 314.5 225.2 342.1 264.4 257.7 209.3 
1970 327.7 224.4 371.7 283.2 283.0 213.5 
1971 333.0 234.4 394.7 297.7 290.4 220.8 
1972 337.2 239.5 420.6 316.1 303.3 228.6 
1973 351.0 251.9 443.5 331.6 315.1 236.2 
1974 359.2 258.5 462.2 344.7 326.6 244.8 
1975 372.9 264.0 436.1 343.4 342.2 252.0 
1976 385.2 264.8 460.2 359.1 356.6 256.1 
1977 403.1 281.4 481.0 375.9 369.3 267.6 
1978 417.6 288.2 484.0 374.6 378.2 270.9 
1979 421.7 288.8 511.4 395.0 384.0 273.2 
1980 416.1 291.7 528.0 404.1 393.6 280.8 
1981 422.4 293.8 509.5 403.7 401.1 279.4 
1982 427.7 304.3 510.7 411.4 406.2 284.8 
1983 431.8 301.2 530.3 423.0 413.8 289.1 
1984 444.1 309.1 533.4 424.4 419.6 295.9 
1985 444.4 301.5 560.6 433.9 427.5 298.2 
1986 454.5 307.5 579.5 444.1 432.9 303.7 
1987 460.9 312.3 575.2 451.5 439.8 305.2 
1988 457.5 317.0 595.4 465.8 445.2 312.0 
1989 442.6 309.9 619.3 485.5 445.2 314.6 
1990 424.4 289.3 655.4 507.6 429.9 305.7 
1991 377.7 254.9 668.3 524.6 362.6 267.3 
1992 344.9 247.0 665.9 534.5 343.8 261.3 
1993 356.2 245.6 654.5 536.5 306.4 262.8 
1994 380.2 252.9 668.3 548.4 314.7 271.7 
1995 410.2 256.6 694.7 563.7 350.1 287.7 
1996 424.2 257.0 708.7 577.6 380.4 302.9 
1997 466.4 265.1 734.7 590.9 365.7 305.2 
1998 496.6 275.9 765.0 613.3 346.7 308.9 
1999 516.6 284.7 806.2 635.0 369.3 312.4 
2000 556.2 296.7 855.5 658.3 386.1 322.7 
2001 557.9 307.7 882.6 664.0 391.1 333.1 
2002 570.7 321.6 893.7 675.2 405.0 342.8 
2003 607.9 334.0 900.6 681.1 419.8 356.8 
2004 629.7 350.0 926.0 698.7 474.2 374.1 
2005 657.2 363.9 949.6 715.5 520.6 399.2 
Sources: GDP from Maddison (2006), industrial value-added from: WIFO [Austria]; Eckstein 
(1955), p. 171, Czirják (1973), and Alton et al. (1982) [Hungary]; Pryor (1975), Lazarcik 
(1969), and Alton et al. (1982) [Czechoslovakia]; after 1975, from Alton et al. (1991), and EU 
KLEMS (www.euklems.net).  
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Table A.3. Branch Shares in Total Manufacturing Gross Value Added (Per Cent) 
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1870         
Imperial Austria 29.2 31.6 2.0 2.8 2.9 14.2  
Imperial Hungary 56.8 0.6 2.9 1.7 2.6 10.7  
         
1890         
Imperial Austria 31.1 30.4 3.0 3.4 4.4 9.9 0.5 
Imperial Hungary 46.8 3.6 5.9 3.2 5.3 10.5  
         
1913         
Imperial Austria 25.0 22.0 5.5 8.6 11.1 7.4 3.0 
Imperial Hungary 34.4 7.5 8.0 7.0 11.1 6.8 1.4 
Gross value-added in constant 1913 prices. 










Figure 1  
Installed capacity in electrical power generation per head of the population  
 





































































Number of residents in the country per registered automobile in 1935 
 
Source: data from Hidvégi and Vonyó (2012) 
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1870         
Imperial Austria 29.2 31.6 2.0 2.8 2.9 14.2  
Imperial Hungary 56.8 0.6 2.9 1.7 2.6 10.7  
         
1890         
Imperial Austria 31.1 30.4 3.0 3.4 4.4 9.9 0.5 
Imperial Hungary 46.8 3.6 5.9 3.2 5.3 10.5  
         
1913         
Imperial Austria 25.0 22.0 5.5 8.6 11.1 7.4 3.0 
Imperial Hungary 34.4 7.5 8.0 7.0 11.1 6.8 1.4 
Gross value-added in constant 1913 prices. 
Source: Schulze (2000), with minor corrections. 
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